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Many financial assets, especially government bonds, are issued by an auction. An 
important feature of the design is the auction pricing mechanism: Uniform vs. 
Discriminatory. Theoretical papers do not provide a definite answer regarding the 
dominance of one type of auction over the other. We investigate the revealed preferences 
of the issuers by surveying the sovereign issuers that conduct auctions. We find that the 
majority of the issuers/countries in our sample use a discriminatory auction mechanism 
for issuing government debt securities. We use a multinomial logit procedure and 
discriminatory analysis to investigate the mechanism choice.  It was interesting to find 
that market oriented economies and those that practice Common law tend to use a 
uniform method while economies who are less market oriented and practice Civil law 
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1. Introduction  
There is a long standing debate regarding the auction system that a sovereign 
should use when it issues debt instruments. As early as 1960, Milton Friedman has 
argued that a discriminatory auction will drive out uninformed participants because of the 
“winner’s curse” and attract better informed, typically large players. Thus, the 
discriminatory mechanism will be more susceptible to collusion than the uniform one. 
Friedman predicted that the discriminatory auction would lead to lower revenues. 
Alternatively, a uniform price mechanism would lead to wider participation which should 
result in lesser collusion and higher revenues. It is puzzling, therefore, to find that most 
countries, in our study, use the discriminatory price mechanism.  
While sovereign bonds comprise one of the largest primary markets, they are not 
the only financial asset that is initially sold via auctions. In a more general setting, most 
of the current, public and academic, debate with respect to financial auctions revolves 
around two main issues. The first is whether to use an auction or another selling 
mechanism1. Given an auction offering, the second issue is the auction specific design. 
The focus of this paper is on the very important feature of the design; the pricing rule: 
What may explain and determine the choice between a uniform auction or a 
discriminatory one.2  While the focus of our paper is on sovereign bonds, the questions 
that are related to the choice of a pricing mechanism in financial auctions should be of 
interest to a wider audience. 
It is important to note at the outset that this is a challenging academic question 
which has not been resolved. The academic literature since Friedman (1960) is not 
conclusive regarding the optimal offering system and pricing mechanism for repetitive 
bond auctions. In addition to the on going academic debate this is also a very important 
practical issue that countries are coping with. Many countries in our sample have moved 
from one pricing rule to another after debating the issue and in the case of the U.S. 
devoting time and resources for experimentation. The so called “Salomon Squeeze” in 
                                                                          
1 The recent Google and Morningstar auctions, may have started a new approach to IPOs of stocks in the 
U.S. and elsewhere. 
2 In the Uniform Price Auction (UPA) (also known as Single Price Auction), the objects are awarded to 
the bidders that bid above the market clearing price.  All bidders pay the same price, the market clearing 
price, for the entire quantity that they are awarded. In the Discriminatory Auction (DA) (also known as 
Pay Your Bid Auction or Multiple Prices Auction), the objects are also awarded to the bidders that bid 
above the market clearing price. However, each bidder pays the price that he bid. 
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May 1991 (Jagadeesh 1993) has triggered an examination of the auctioning system, in 
particular the pricing mechanism. The US treasury decided to carry out an experiment 
using the two pricing rules in parallel, for different bond issues. The results of this 
experiment are documented in Malvey, Archibald, and Flynn (1995), Nyborg and 
Sundaresan, (1996), Malvey and Archibald (1998) and Goldreich (2007). While the 
experiment results did not provide a significant revenue improvement in the uniform 
mechanism versus the discriminatory, additional considerations have contributed to the 
decision to switch to the uniform price mechanism,  
In the analysis of the markets for sovereign bonds, one must take into account the 
three major interested parties or stakeholders: the first is issuer, be it the treasury or the 
central bank. The issuer’s objective is to maximize revenues over time taking into 
account long term considerations. Hence, in addition to short term consideration like the 
revenues from a forthcoming specific auction, the issuer cares about the structure and 
quality of the secondary market, including the symmetry of allocation and the likelihood 
of collusion in the auction or the secondary market since it will affect the cost of future 
issues. In addition the sovereign may have additional objectives that can be related to 
macro economic considerations or foreign policy considerations such as the level of 
foreign holding of its debt. The second stakeholders are the intermediaries, who serve as 
the underwriters, designated dealers, dealers and brokers. The designated dealers profit 
from purchasing the issue and selling it to the public which can be either institutional 
investors or private investors. Their goal is to maximize the profit from this activity. They 
can potentially gain from market inefficiencies. The third stakeholder is the public, 
including financial institutions who invest in these debt instruments.  They, of course, 
would like to pay the lowest possible price, at the same time, they gain from market 
liquidity and efficiency.  
Our research consists of two parts. In the first part we document the recent 
auction mechanism designs employed by treasuries and central banks around the globe 
(their revealed preferences). In the second part, we analyze, in a cross sectional setting, 
the factors that are potentially related to the choice of a mechanism by country. Given our 
results, we provide an explanation that is consistent with our empirical findings that take 
into account the different bargaining power of the three stakeholders. 
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Even though the primary market for government debt is one of the largest 
financial markets in the world, there is no source of public data that provides cross 
country information about treasury auctions. This information can only be obtained by 
collecting data directly from each country. We have contacted Treasury ministries and 
central banks around the globe and received answers from 48 countries. We have 
carefully screened this unique data base and documented which country is using what 
mechanism (discriminatory, uniform, both or other pricing rule). Our sample consists of 
countries from different continents, different populations and economic size, including 
almost all (83%) the OECD countries.3  
      Most countries that responded to our survey use a discriminatory auction to sell their 
debt. It is important to note that some of them are using both mechanisms, depending on 
the security being auctioned, while others are using pricing rules which are neither 
uniform nor discriminatory. We investigate the factors which may explain the choice of 
auction mechanism by a sovereign. We find that countries that have more market oriented 
economies (as measured by capitalization / GDP) and practice Common law tend to use a 
uniform price auction. A possible explanation could be that the financial environment in 
these countries is more attuned to the preferences of public investors, which in the 
Brenner, Galai and Sade (2007) study seem to be the uniform price mechanism. This 
attracts wider participation and, as other empirical and experimental papers suggest, 
results in higher revenues. In other countries where the financial environment is less 
developed and barriers to the public’s participation in the auctions (direct or indirect) 
may exist, the central planner needs to be more attuned to the preferences of the 
intermediaries, and if they prefer a discriminatory price auction the central planner will 
adopt this mechanism. 
 Our paper belongs to the growing literature on divisible-unit auctions. Recent 
work in the theory of divisible-unit auctions investigates the trade-offs that the central 
planner faces in the use of the different mechanisms.4 They show that the uniform price 
                                                                          
3 We do not have in our sample the following OECD countries: Czech Republic, Denmark, Netherlands, 
Spain and the Slovak Republic. 
4 See, for example, Wilson (1979), Back and Zender (1993), Ausubel and Cramton (2002) or Wang and 
Zender (2002) for theoretical evidence on strategic bidding in multi-unit auctions. A survey article on 
auction theory by Das and Sundaram (1996) discusses the lessons from theoretical models for T-bill 
auctions, and presents some empirical evidence. 
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mechanism may result in multiple equilibria and there exist non-cooperative equilibria 
under the uniform-price format that support collusive outcomes. They also show that 
these collusive outcomes are not supported by discriminatory auctions. The theory is 
inconclusive, it does not tell us whether the uniform price auctions will generate higher 
revenue than the discriminatory price auctions. This remains an empirical issue that our 
research is trying to contribute to.  
Most of the empirical work that compared these two auction mechanisms use an 
event study approach (e.g. studies of the US experiment). However, this approach suffers 
from the fact that in these cases it is hard to argue that nothing has changed in the 
economic environment and in the information set around the event (e.g. the Solomon 
squeeze has contributed to the US change from discriminatory to uniform).  
Additional empirical studies employ structural econometric modeling to compare 
the alternative auction mechanisms.5 These papers use a bidder's optimality condition to 
recover the distribution of the marginal valuations of the bidders. At its current stage, 
structural econometric literature does not provide a clear answer with respect to the 
mechanism choice.  
A previous cross country description of auction design issues is Bartolini and 
Cottarelli (1997). While their paper describes various aspects of the auction mechanism, 
our paper focuses on the determinants of the choice of the auction pricing rule.  
The novelty of our paper is to use a cross section approach and look for 
explanatory variables that may help to understand the sovereign’s decision. While the 
advantages of learning from common practices are straightforward, the challenge in our 
empirical investigation is to overcome the fact that countries do not adjust their auction 
system very frequently. Thus, identifying the important factors that affect the choice of 
an auction mechanism would be rather rewarding. The results of the survey show that 
most of the countries in our sample use the discriminatory price mechanism. We find that 
proxies associated with the development of financial markets play an important role in 
the auction design mechanism.  
 The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 looks at the auction practices of 
different countries. In section 3 we investigate what affects the country’s choice by 
                                                                          
5 Hortaçsu (2002), Kastl (2005) 
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proposing factors such as the legal system, wealth, “free markets” and other economic 
factors. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.  
 
2. Auction Methods Used by Issuers of Government Bonds 
We first investigated the current practices used worldwide at treasury auctions.6 
Since this information is not available in public databases we had to use our own survey 
as a method for gathering the information. We have sent a short survey (see appendix A) 
via e-mails and faxes to central banks and treasuries around the globe7. We received 
answers from 48 countries, listed in Table 1. 
Our results (Table 1) indicate that most countries in our sample, 50%, use a 
discriminatory price mechanism to issue government debt, about 19% use a uniform price 
auction while approximately 19% use both mechanisms depending on the type of debt 
instruments being issued.  The rest of the countries, about 12%, use a pricing method that 
is different than the two conventional ones (e.g. Austria).  
 Interestingly, even among countries with the same currency and relatively similar 
monetary policy (for example, the EU countries that use the Euro) different types of 
auctions mechanisms are used to sell each country’s debt instruments. Finland, for 
example, which used a uniform price mechanism,8 does not use auctions anymore 
(although it now considers using them in the future), while France and Germany9 
currently use a discriminatory price mechanism. We also find that in some countries the 
mechanism that is being used to sell treasury debt has changed over time (e.g. the US has 
switched in the 1990s from a discriminatory mechanism to a uniform one, while 
Mongolia switched from the uniform mechanism to the discriminatory one and Singapore 
introduced a uniform price mechanism for some of its debt). In about 50% of our sample, 
the country employed in the past a different selling mechanism than the one it currently 
uses. Some countries in our sample use more than one type of pricing rule to sell their 
                                                                          
6 Most of the documentation and analysis of pricing rules for financial auctions was done with respect to 
treasury auctions, mainly due to data availability and the size of these auctions 
7 The survey was sent via e-mail to all the central banks that their e-mails were listed at Bank for 
International Settlements, international directory and to the treasuries and Central banks that their e-mails/ 
home pages were listed at the IMF home page. In some cases, when we did not get a response, we used 
personal contacts to get answers to the survey. 
8 See Keloharju, Nyborg and Rydqvist (2003) 
9  See Rocholl (2004) 
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debt instruments (e.g. Canada and Brazil). Some use different auction mechanism to issue 
debt than to buy back debt (e.g USA).10  The wide use of different pricing mechanisms 
also applies to additional financial instruments such as corporate bonds (e.g. in Israel a 
discriminatory auction is used for Treasury securities while a uniform auction is used for 
corporate bonds and stocks.)  
Given the different practices and the changes introduced by some countries it is 
clear that research, theoretical, experimental and/or empirical, about auction designs 
would be of great interest to a variety of issuers, be it governments or corporations. Thus, 
we also examine the features which make up the profile of a country to see if there are 
common features that can be associated with one auction design or another. 
 
 
3. What may affect the choice of an auction mechanism by a country? 
Given the potential consequences of the optimal mechanism choice on the 
revenue obtained and the subsequent activity in the secondary markets, it is surprising 
that we don’t find any cross country research about what may affect this choice.   
As stated above, the cross section empirical analysis, done for the first time, looks 
for specific characteristics that affect the mechanism choice. It should be noted that there 
is no model that provides specific guidelines as to the variables that we should include in 
the empirical investigation. We have decided to use a set of macro variables that have 
been used in studying other macro finance issues and seemed to be appropriate in our 
context.  
The first set of variables is related to the risk of the assets that are being 
auctioned, more specifically the credit risk of the sovereign. The second set of variables 
is related to the specific characteristics of the country that issues the debt and the 
characteristics of its financial markets. We have thus examined the recent literature which 
investigates the different global financial systems, trying to explain their growth and 
efficiency, as well as other characteristics, by their legal system and other economic and 
non-economic variables. La Porta et al (1998), Levine (1999) and others, investigate the 
role of the legal system and argue that legal systems that protect creditors and enforce 
                                                                          
10 See Han, Longstaff and Merril (2005) for the description of the US treasury buyback auctions. 
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contracts are likely to encourage greater financial intermediary development than legal 
and regulatory systems that impede creditors from gaining access to their claims or that 
ineffectively enforce contracts.  Rajan and Zingales (1998 and 2003) discuss how to 
measure financial development and suggest that the measures would capture the ease 
with which any entrepreneur or company or country can raise funds and the confidence 
with which investors anticipate an adequate return. We follow the approaches described 
in the above articles and use some of the variables that they use in order to see if some of 
these proxies may shed some light on the question at hand. In addition, we collected data 
that includes several indexes that rank different countries according to the easiness of 
conducting business, the freedom of the economy and the level of corruption. We 
investigate if the different ranking is an indicator to the different mechanism being 
employed. 
 While we would like to have additional variables such as the number of participants in 
the auction markets and their relative market participation in dollar value, unfortunately 
this information is not only unavailable to us but is also unavailable to most issuer 
(central banks and treasuries) since each direct participant in the auction may represent 
several other participants.11 
 
3.1 Empirical Results 
3.1.1 Data Sources 
        In our empirical investigation of the variables that may explain the auction 
system chosen by a country we use the following variables: 
Type of Auction: U=uniform, D= discriminatory, B= both O = not using auctions to 
sell debt instruments. 
We collected several potential explanatory variables that describe the asset being sold 
and the issuer. They were obtained from different sources:12 
(1) The "World Bank" 
(2) Moody's 
(3) IFC 
                                                                          
11 For a discussion of the limitation of the auction data in the U.S see  Fleming (2007) 
12 We will be happy to provide the full data base for researchers upon request. 
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(4) Wall Street Journal 
(5) Transparency International  
For the specific characteristics of the asset that is being auctioned we use default risk. 
The rationale for investigating its effect on the mechanism choice is the following; 
due to the potential negative effect of the winner’s “curse” on potential participants 
and their bidding strategies, riskier debt with higher uncertainty will be auctioned in a 
uniform price mechanism. 
• Moody's Sovereign debt ratings: (Source:  Moody’s August  2005.) The 
ratings serve as a proxy for the riskiness of the debt. 
• Indebtedness Classification. (Source: World Bank- 2003.) The World Bank 
classifies countries by their level of indebtedness for the purpose of developing 
debt management strategies. It uses a three-point scale: severely indebted (S), 
moderately indebted (M), and less indebted (L).13  The Indebtedness classification 
also serves as proxy for the riskiness of the debt and the level of uncertainty that 
is associated with it. 
Variables that describe the legal, financial structure and economic environment of the 
countries that issue the debt include: 
• Civil (Roman) Law versus Common Law. This variable was proposed by La 
Porta et al (1998). Common law is associated with countries that have a more 
liberal economic system, small role for the government like Britain, the United 
States, Australia, while civil law is associated with economies where the 
government plays a larger role like France, Germany, Japan. We investigate 
whether the auction mechanism is associated with the legal system in the country.   
• Stock Market Capitalization as Percentage of the GDP. (Source: World Bank 
– 2003.) Market capitalization is the share price times the number of shares 
outstanding and is calculated as percentage of the GDP. This variable serves as a 
proxy for the degree of development of the financial markets. By using this 
                                                                          
13 The most severely indebted countries may be eligible for debt relief under special programs, such as the 
HIPC Debt Initiative. Indebted countries may also apply to the Paris and London Clubs for renegotiation of 
obligations to public and private creditors. In 2003, countries with a present value of debt service greater 
than 220 percent of exports or 80 percent of GNI were classified as severely indebted, countries that were 
not severely indebted but whose present value of debt service exceeded 132 percent of exports or 48 
percent of GNI were classified as moderately indebted, and countries that did not fall into either group were 
classified as less indebted. 
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variable we test if there is a relationship between the level of the development of 
financial markets and the auction mechanism 
• GDP. –(Source: World bank – 2003.) GDP is measured in current US dollars. 
GDP serves as proxy for country size. 
 
We also use several indexes that rank the level of competitiveness, economic freedom 
and corruption in the country 
• The Ease of Doing Business 2006 index. (source: IFC) . This index  ranks 
countries on their ease of doing business, from 1 – 175. A high ranking on the 
ease of doing business index means the regulatory environment is conducive to 
the operation of business. This index averages the country's percentile rankings on 
10 topics, made up of a variety of indicators. 
• The CPI Corruption Index 2005. (Source:  Transparency International) aims 
to measure the overall extent of corruption (frequency and/or size of bribes) in the 
public and political sectors. The index ranks countries from 1 to 158.  
• The Index of Economic Freedom 2006, (Source: the Heritage 
Foundation/Wall Street Journal) The index uses 50 independent variables 
divided into 10 broad factors of economic freedom to rank 161 countries. 
 
3.1.2 Empirical Findings – A Univariate Investigation 
   
We divided our sample into 3 categories according to the pricing mechanism, 
those that use the discriminatory (24 countries), those that use the uniform (9 countries) 
and those that use both mechanisms (9 countries). Table 2 provides the means and 
medians of these variables with respect to the auction mechanism being used.  
First, we find that countries that use a discriminatory price mechanism have on 
average significantly lower capitalization to GDP ratio compared with countries that use 
a uniform price mechanism (P=0.03) 14 and countries that use both mechanisms (P=0.04). 
There is no significant difference in the average of this ratio between countries that use 
both mechanism and those that use the uniform price mechanism.  
                                                                          
14 Equal variance is not assumed in all the t-tests described in this section.  
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Second, we find that the type of law practiced in countries that use a 
discriminatory price mechanism is significantly (p=0.038) different than the law system 
in countries that use a uniform price mechanism. Specifically we find that countries that 
use a discriminatory price mechanism tend to be countries with a civil law system.15 
Third, we do not find GDP to be significantly different, on average, between 
countries that use the discriminatory mechanism and countries that use the uniform price 
mechanism. 
Fourth, although we find that the frequency of Indebtedness Classification is 
higher for countries that use a discriminatory price mechanism compared with those that 
use a uniform price mechanism, the difference is only marginally significant. 
Fifth, we find, using a standard non parametric test, that the ranking of Ease of 
Doing Business Index for countries that use a uniform price mechanism is significantly 
better than those that use a discriminatory price mechanism. 
             Though we find that a lower Corruption Index level and a higher level of 
Economic Freedom Index is associated with countries that employ a uniform price 
mechanism compared with the discriminatory price mechanism, these differences are not 
statistically significant.  
In summary, the univariate investigation indicates that variables that are 
associated with development of financial markets: capitalization to GDP, ease of doing 
business and the type of law employed are statistically significant.   
 
3.1.3 A Multivariate Investigation – Multinomial Logit and Discriminatory 
Analysis 
            In order to estimate which variables affect the mechanism choice we conducted a 
multinomial regression analysis. Our dependent variable consists of 4 groups and the 
categories are not ordered. Hence, a Multinomial Logistic regression is the natural 
statistical model to use.16  
                                                                          
15 The same applies to the difference between countries that use a discriminatory mechanism vs. countries 
that use both types of mechanisms.  
16 Multinomial logit models are a straightforward extension of logistic models. While the logit models are 
used for binary independent variables where the logistic distribution is used to derive the probability, the 
generalization to more than two alternatives (here we have 4) is referred to as the multinomial logit models. 
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The Multinomial Logit model has the form: 
 
Where βs serve as the coefficients and p is the probability. 
Our dependent variable was classified into 4 categories as follows:  
Countries that use the uniform price mechanism = 1 
Countries that use the discriminatory price mechanism = 2 
Countries that use both mechanisms = 3 
Countries that use other types of auctions= 4 
We estimated 4 different models with a different set of independent variables.  In Table 3 
we present the values of the coefficients and the statistical significance only for the 
comparison between the uniform price mechanism and the discriminatory price 
mechanism. When using a Multinomial Logit regression, one category of the dependent 
variable is chosen as the reference variable. In our investigation the discriminatory price 
mechanism is the reference group. 
Our main finding is that capitalization/GDP is positively and significantly 
correlated with the choice of a uniform price mechanism, rather than the discriminatory 
price mechanism. The dummy variable for civil law vs. common law is significantly 
correlated with the bidding system (see Table 3.) When the two variables are used 
together to estimate the mechanism choice, only the capitalization as percentage of the 
GDP remains significant. This could be due to multicolinearity; the Pearson correlation 
between these two variables; legal system and Capitalization/GDP ratio is --0.354 which 
is significant. (See Table 4.) Neither the GDP by itself nor the Dummy for Indebtedness 
Classification are significantly correlated with the mechanism choice.17 
It is important to note that countries do not change their auction mechanism 
frequently and we have conducted the survey in a specific point in time. Given the 
sample size this may somewhat affect the explanatory power of our model since we may 
be capturing some countries that were in transition between auction mechanisms. Yet, 
                                                                          
17 We also examined the choice between using both mechanisms vs. using only the discriminatory price 
mechanism. The only variable that is significant and negatively correlated with the decision to use “both” 
mechanisms compared to using the discriminatory mechanism is the dummy variable for civil law. All the 
other variables examined in this section are insignificant.  
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even with this statistical noise the Capitalization/GDP variable turns out to be significant 
and explains about 10% of the mechanism choice.  
For robustness we also conducted a discriminatory analysis on the countries that 
use a uniform price mechanism versus those that use a discriminatory price mechanism. 
The discriminatory analysis is used in the literature to classify cases into categorical 
dependence. The results that we obtain using this procedure are consistent with our 
multinomial logit results. We find that we can correctly classify 82% of the observations 
by using only the Capitalization/GDP variable, moreover adding other variables from our 
list does not significantly improve our ability to classify. The Wilks' Lambda test is 
significance at 0.007 
Our results suggest that the country characteristics play an important role in the 
mechanism choice. Interestingly, this is consistent with the paper of Doidge, Karolyi and 
Stulz, (2006) who found that the country characteristics are more important than firm 
characteristics with respect to corporate governance. 
Why does the financial markets development factor play such an important role in 
the auction design decision of the issuer? Why countries with less developed financial 
markets choose the discriminatory auction? Our conjecture is related to the bargaining 
power of the different financial players in the market.    
In many countries, because of regulations, financial market development or 
barrier to entry for investors, the issuer can not rely on sufficient (at a desirable minimum 
price) direct investor participation and needs the help of the intermediaries in order to sell 
the issue. If the intermediaries prefer discriminatory price mechanism, then the issuer has 
an incentive to use this pricing mechanism.18 
Why would dealers/intermediaries prefer a discriminatory mechanism? One 
possible explanation is that this mechanism does not result in one known equal price to 
all investors, which helps them to sell it at a higher price in the secondary market. 
Another possible explanation relates to Friedman’s argument, that the discriminatory 
mechanism reduces the number of potential bidders and hence the number of potential 
competitors. Another explanation is related to the price paid by the bidders. Sade, 
Schnitzlein and Zender (2006) experimental work shows that under pre-determined 
                                                                          
18 For part of our sample we were able to collect the total size of government debt and indeed those 
countries that use a discriminatory price mechanism have on average larger government debt to GDP ratio. 
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number of participants in the discriminatory mechanism, on average, the participants 
collude more and pay lower prices. 
On the other hand in countries with well developed financial markets, the 
intermediaries have less bargaining power in setting the auction mechanism choice since 
the central player can rely on the public participation. A supportive argument, consistent 
with this conjecture, is made by Brenner, Galai and Sade (2007) in an experimental 
study. They show that when investors are given the choice between a uniform auction 
and a discriminatory one, they prefer to participate in a uniform auction, and are willing 
to pay higher prices. It is suggested that a possible reason for such a preference is that 
uniform auctions are perceived as "fair" and transparent by the participants.19 
Given the intermediaries assumed preferences on one hand, the investors/public 
assumed preferences on the other hand and the issuer’s objective, it is clear why the 
bargaining power between the three different stakeholders may affect the auction’s 
mechanism choice.20 
                                                                          
19 In addition see Garbade (2004) for the description of the 1959 testimony by Robert Anderson, the 
Secretary of the Treasury who suggested that small banks, corporations, and individuals do not have the 
"professional capacity" to bid at the discriminatory price mechanism. 
20 It could be argued that the main consideration in choosing a discriminatory auction in the US Treasury 
buy back program is the dealers bargaining power.   
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4. Summary and Conclusions 
 In issuing financial assets governments and corporations face a major decision; 
what is the optimal offering process to sell their debt or equity? Most governments and 
some corporations use an auction mechanism. There are basically two common types of 
auctions for financial assets: the uniform price auction and the discriminatory price 
auction. The existing theoretical and empirical work is ambivalent about the method that 
issuers should choose. 
 We find that most countries use the discriminatory method, and fewer use the 
uniform one. However, an important factor that is associated with the uniform price 
mechanism is the “market oriented economy”. We also find that countries that use the 
uniform price mechanism tend to be “common law” countries  and have on average a 
more favorable ranking for “easiness of doing business”, economic freedom and the level 
of corruption. Using multinomial analysis, we find that Capitalization/GDP is 
significantly correlated with the mechanism choice. A discriminatory analysis provides 
similar results.   
 So why do we find so many countries using the discriminatory pricing method? Our 
conjecture is that the financial markets in many of these countries are dominated by a few 
large financial intermediaries and it is in their interest, paying lower prices, to have a 
discriminatory price mechanism rather than a uniform price mechanism. These few 
institutions are better informed than the rest of the public simply because they hold a 
large portion of the potential bids either as proprietary bidders or as agents for other 
bidders. This conjecture is supported by our tests that show that the discriminatory 
method is used more in countries which have less developed financial markets21 . 
  
                                                                          
21 An additional explanation for the origin of using a given rule or method has to do with the evolution of 
financial markets around the globe. Since the development of financial markets around the globe has, by 
and large, lagged behind the U.S many countries have just followed the U.S example without questioning 
its rationale and whether it is appropriate and fits the market structure of that country. 
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Table 1 
Survey Answers Regarding the Type of Auctions Used to sell 
Government Debt in Different Countries around the World as of April  
- October 2005 
The Table describes the answers to a survey that were obtained from treasuries and 
central bank during 2005 and 2006 regarding the auction mechanism being used to sell 
the country’s debt. UPA is Uniform Price Mechanism and DPA is Discriminatory Price 
Auction. The questions are presented in Appendix A. 
 
 














Argentina √ UPA No No 




has the right to 
cancel a tender 
Austria √ Multiple Price - 
the coupon is 
calculated on the 
basis of the 
weighted average 
of the accepted 
yields and an 
issue price which 
shall be as close 










Program for long 
term bonds (EUR 
and FX) and ATB-
Program for money 
market 
instruments) by 
selling them to a 
group of dealers 
In case the 
book shows 
huge demand 




Bangladesh √ DPA Yes Yes 
Belgium √ 
Only  the 
launching  of 
new OLO 
benchmarks 
is done by 
syndication 
DPA Yes 
Underwriting by a 
consortium of 
banks (prior  the 
adoption of the 
primary dealers 















auction,  as a 
function of 
their successful 
bids.   
Brazil √ Both UPA and 
DPA 
No No 




Canada √ Primary: DPA, 








(Not in use) 
Colombia √ UPA Yes 
Some securities  
are placed directly 
by the Treasury 
Department. In the 
past inflation 
linked bonds (only 
the coupons were 
indexed) were  






√ DPA  Yes Yes 
Can reduce the 
amount 
announced 
Ecuador √ DPA No No 











France √ DPA  No (however, 
new/innovative 









issued for the 







led by the 
Deutsche 
Bundesbank, i.e. 
the central bank) 
Yes 
 
Ghana √ DPA and UPA No No 







If prices given 




given for the 
remaining 
20%, the issuer 
has the right to 
accept only 
80% of the 
auction 
amount. 
Hungary √ DPA No No 
Ireland √ Competitive 
Auction - Best 










UPA for Bonds 










Yet, the main 






DPA No No 






Yes Not Relevant 






Latvia √ DPA where the 
80% of debt is 
offered at the 
Bank of Latvia 
the next day the 
20% of debt is 




DPA where the 
100% of debt were 




Lithuania  √ 
 
DPA No Yes 
 
Luxembourg No 




---- No ---- 
Macedonia √ DPA No No 




Issued in the past at 
par without the 
Yes for T-bills, 
No for Malta 
Government 
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Auction) possibility of 
investors bidding at 
a different price 
Stocks 
Mauritius √ DPA No No 
Mexico √ Both DPA and 
UPA  
Yes 




Mongolia √ DPA Yes 





Norway √ UPA Yes 
DPA 
No 










right to issue 
less than the 
full amount of 
securities 
offered in any 
auction. 
Panama √ DPA No Yes 














DPA  ----- Yes 
Sierra Leon √ UPA for Bearer 
Bonds and DPA 
for Treasury Bills
Yes 
Fixed Interest Rate 
Yes 










have used multiple 
price auction for 
No 
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price auction for 
T-bills 
both Government 



















DPA No Yes 
 























Until the early 
1990s gilts were 





right not to 
allot all the 
stock on offer 
at a gilt auction 
in exceptional 
circumstances 
where it judges 
bids to be at an 
unacceptably 
deep discount 
U.S.A √ UPA DA  Yes 
Yet, was not in 
use 











This table describes the descriptive statistics of the countries according to the auction 
mechanism employed by them.  Indebtedness Classification. (Source: World Bank- 
2003.) The World Bank classifies countries by their level of indebtedness for the 
purpose of developing debt management strategies. It uses a three-point scale: 
severely indebted (S), moderately indebted (M), and less indebted (L). The Indebtness 
classification  also serves as proxy for the riskiness of the  country. Civil (Roman) 
Law versus Common Law. This variable was proposed by La Porta et al (1998). We 
try to see whether the auction mechanism is associated with the legal system in a 
country.  Stock Market Capitalization as Percentage of the GDP. (Source: World 
Bank – 2003.) Market capitalization is the share price times the number of shares 
outstanding  and is calculated as percentage of the GDP.GDP. –(Source: World bank 
– 2003.) GDP is measured in current US dollars. Ease of Doing Business 
2006.(source: IFC - published in 2005) The ease of doing business index ranks 









% of civil law 83%22 44% 43% 
Avg Stock Market 








Median Stock Market 
Capitalization % of 
GDP 
28%24 101% 42% 








Percentage of  
Indebtedness 
Classification 
67%25 33% 44% 








                                                                          
22 Based on 23 observations since we do not have the classification for the source of law of Solomon 
Islands. 
23 Based on 19 observations since data was not available for Cambodia, Macedonia, Malta, Cyprus and 
Solomon Islands. 
24 Based on 19 observations since data was not available for Cambodia, Macedonia, Malta, Cyprus and 
Solomon Islands 
25 Based on 21 observations since data was not available for Malta, Cyprus and Solomon Islands 
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Median Ranking of 
Ease of Doing Business 
5228 1129 70 








Median Ranking of 
Corruption Index 
5131 17 40 
Average ranking of 
Economics Freedom 
Index 
5532 39 51 
Median Ranking Of 
Economics Freedom 
Index 
4433 30 42 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
26 Based on 22 observations since data was not available for Malta and Cyprus. 
27 Based on 8 observations since data was not available for Trinidad and Tobago. 
28 Based on 22 observations since data was not available for Malta and Cyprus. 
29 Based on 8 observations since data was not available for Trinidad and Tobago 
30 Based on 23 observations since data was not available for Solomon Islands. 
31 Based on 23 observations since data was not available for Solomon Islands. 
32 Based on 23 observations since data was not available for Solomon Islands. 
33 Based on 23 observations since data was not available for Solomon Islands. 
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Table 3 
What Explains Mechanism Choices? – Multinomial Analysis. 
 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES: For completeness and statistical accuracy we 
conducted Multinomial analysis that included 4 categories: Uniform, Discriminatory, 
Both and Other mechanism. We present here only the comparison between the 
Uniform and the Discriminatory mechanism. Discriminatory Mechanism is the 
comparison group. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES: dummy for Indebtedness 
Classification. (Source: World Bank- 2003.) The World Bank classifies countries by 
their level of indebtedness for the purpose of developing debt management strategies. 
It uses a three-point scale: severely indebted (S), moderately indebted (M), and less 
indebted (L). The Indebtedness classification  also serves as proxy for the riskiness of 
the  country. Civil (Roman) Law versus Common Law. This variable was proposed by 
La Porta et al (1998). We try to see whether the auction mechanism is associated with 
the legal system in a country.  Stock Market Capitalization as Percentage of the GDP. 
(Source: World Bank – 2003.) Market capitalization is the share price times the 
number of shares outstanding and is calculated as percentage of the GDP. GDP. –
(Source: World bank – 2003.) GDP is measured in current US dollars. Ease of Doing 
Business 2006.(source: IFC - published in 2005)  
    Z values are in parenthesis. ** = significant at 5% level. * = significant at 10% level. 
We estimated 4 different specifications as follow. 
 









Cap / GDP 0.030 ** 
(2.579) 












Dummy (Civil Law) _______ _______ -1.823 ** 
(-2.020) 
 -1.140 
(-1.071)   
     
Pseudo R2 0.096 0.106 0.088 0.126 
Prob > chi(n) 0.023** 0.069* 0.115 0.057* 
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Table 4 
Pearson and Spearman’s Rho Correlation Matrix 
Spearman rho non parametric correlation result is the lower line. ** = significant at 5% 
level. * = significant at 10% level 
 

















GDP    -0.279* 
-0.407** 
  
Civil stands for civil law 
Cap stands for capitalization 










Appendix A – Survey Submitted to Treasuries and Central Banks 
 
 
Professors Dan Galai and Dr. Orly Sade from the Finance Department at the School of 
Business Administration, Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Professor Menachem 
Brenner from the Finance department at New York University Stern School of Business  
are conducting academic research in an attempt to better understand auction design 
mechanism. The two main mechanisms employed by governments around the globe are: 
the Uniform Price auction (one price, the clearing price, applies to all) and the 
Discriminatory Price auction (bidders pay their price, which is at and above the  
clearing price).  
The survey is very short and answering it should take only a few minutes. We thank you 
in advance for your cooperation. 
 
1. Name of the country _______________ 
 






If the answer to question 2 is yes, please continue to question 3. If the answer is 
no please continue to question 4. 
  
3. What type of auction mechanisms does your country use currently in order to sell 
government debt instruments? ______________ 
 
a. Uniform price mechanism (one price) 
b. Discriminatory price mechanism (pay your bid, multiple price mechanism) 
c. Other _____________ 
 






If the answer to question 4 is yes please continue to question 5. If the answer is no 
please continue to question 6. 
 
5. What was the main reason for the change? _______________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Does the treasury (or the central bank) have the right to change the quantity of 





c. Not relevant 
 
7. Are you aware of any research paper or report (written in English) that is 
investigation the auction mechanism of government instrument in your country? If 
you do we would truly appreciate if you can attach a copy to your reply e-mail or 
refer us to the source. 
 
We would like to thank you for your help. We will obviously be more than happy to share 







Menachem Brenner, Dan Galai and Orly Sade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
